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I. INTRODUCTION
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment guarantees
that no person "shall ... be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."' The clause was applied
equally to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 2 Although
double jeopardy has existed for over two centuries, it has taken the
United States Supreme Court quite some time to unravel exactly
what constitutes being "twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." In
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. It was made applicable through the fourteenth amendment. See Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
1
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the course of that time an interesting dichotomy arose. On a de-
fendant's appeal from a guilty verdict, the appellate court had to
determine whether the guilty verdict was obtained unfairly, in the
eyes of that court, by means of trial error or insufficient evidence.
However, the relief granted (a new trial or acquittal) depended on
the appellant's requested relief.3
Lockhart v. Nelson,4 decided November 14, 1988, dealt with an
aspect of double jeopardy that had not been previously considered
despite the Supreme Court's most recent address to the issue in two
cases, Burks v. United States and Greene v. Massey,6 both decided
June 14, 1978. The specific issue addressed by the Supreme Court
in Lockhart was what effect the double jeopardy clause had on a
reviewing court when it was faced with erroneously admitted evi-
dence-evidence that, when discounted, left the state's burden of
proof unfulfilled.
This comment will discuss the Lockhart opinion, its foundation
in previous Supreme Court decisions, and its implications, both gen-
erally and in West Virginia.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent Johnny Lee Nelson pleaded guilty in Arkansas state
court "to burglary, a class B felony, and misdemeanor theft after
taking forty-five dollars from a vending machine in 1979." , He was
later sentenced under the Arkansas Habitual Offender Statute to
twenty years imprisonment. 8 That statute provides that a defendant
who is convicted of a class B felony and "who has previously been
convicted of ... [or] found guilty of four (4) or more felonies,"
3. For an interesting (and somewhat confusing) survey of the Supreme Court's view of double
jeopardy, see Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298
(1957); Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950). A
good summary is provided by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1978).
4. 109 S. Ct. 285 (1988).
5. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
6. 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
7. Nelson v. Lockhart, 641 F. Supp. 174, 175 (E.D. Ark. 1986), aff'd, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 485 U.S. 904, rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 285 (1988).
8. Nelson, 641 F. Supp. at 175.
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may be sentenced to an enhanced term of imprisonment of between
twenty and forty years. 9
Under the Arkansas statute, in order to enhance the defendant's
sentence, the state must prove at a separate sentencing hearing, be-
yond a reasonable doubt, "that the defendant has the requisite num-
ber of prior felony convictions. "0 The state may use three types of
documents in order to meet its burden. 1 One of these three types
of documents which the state can use to establish the prior felony
convictions is "a duly certified copy of the record of a previous
conviction or a finding of guilt by a court of record."' 12 The de-
fendant is entitled to challenge the state's evidence of his prior con-
victions and to rebut it with his own evidence. 3
At Nelson's sentencing hearing, "the State introduced, without
objection from the defense, certified copies of four prior felony
convictions.' '14 However, one of those convictions had been par-
doned by the Governor of Arkansas several years after its entry. 5
Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel knew of the pardon;
consequently no objection was made to its entry into evidence.
16
Although the respondent testified under cross-examination that it
9. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1001(2)(b) (1977) (current version at ARx. CODE ANN. § 5-4-501(6)
(1987)).
10. ARK. STAT. ANNI. § 41-1005 (1977) (current version at ARK. CODE ANN. § 54-502 (1987)).
11. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1003 (1977) (current version at ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-504 (1987)).
12. Id. The pertinent text of § 41-1003 provided that:
[A] previous conviction or finding of guilt of a felony may be proved by any evidence that
satisfies the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was convicted or
found guilty. The following are sufficient to support a finding or a prior conviction or
finding of guilt:
(1) a duly certified copy of the record of a previous conviction or finding of guilt by a
court of record; or
(2) a certificate of the warden or other chief officer of a penal institution of this state or
of another jurisdiction, containing the name and fingerprints of the defendant, as they
appear in the records of his office; or
(3) a certificate of the chief custodian of the records of the United States Department of
Justice, containing the name and fingerprints of the defendant as they appear in the records
of his office.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1003 (1977).
13. ARK, STAT. ANN. § 41-1005(2) (1977) (current version Aa. CODE ANN. § 5-4-502(2) (1987)).
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was "his belief that the conviction in question had been pardoned,"
the prosecutor suggested that Mr. Nelson had confused a "pardon"
with "commutation to time served.' 1 7 Under further court ques-
tioning, Nelson finally agreed that a commutation indeed had taken
place rather than a pardon. 8 The case was submitted to a jury,'9
which found that the state met its burden of proving four prior
convictions and thence the court imposed an enhanced sentence. The
Arkansas Court of Appeals rejected Nelson's appeal because of his
failure to make a contemporaneous objection to the use of the con-
viction in question.20 Nelson then "petitioned the Arkansas Supreme
Court for post-conviction relief, which was denied" on the basis
that Nelson's assertion of a pardon was unsupported by any factual
evidence. 2'
17. Id.
18. Id. The line of questioning went in this fashion:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Mr. Nelson, you mentioned in reference to the very first conviction
that you had something about a pardon. Was that not really the judge commuted that,
your sentence to time served?
NELSON: No, sir. Just like I said, the time when I got that charge on that rape, assault-
they had me with rape, assault and a robbery. They had the sentences you know in two
sentences. I had the fourteen years and I had a seven years. But during the time I doing
time, on doing time you do the smallest time first and the large time last. Well in the
process ... some more people had my case investigated by the F.B.I. And during that
time Governor Faubus gave me a pardon on the whole thing.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: You're saying on the robbery charge?
NELSON: On the robbery and the rape charge. Of course I was sentenced to 21 years and
I was doing time on the robbery charge .... But in the process of the investigation they
cut the whole thing to time served.
PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, I feel compelled ... to make a motion to strike this tes-
timony because I think the defendant is in error. I think he's confused as to the meaning
of the pardon and a commutation .... I think the records are clear that are in the court
and perhaps some comment by the Court to the jury could clear the matter up.
THE COURT: I think he cleared it up himself when he said it was commuted to time
served. It that what you said?
NELSON: Yes, sir.
Nelson, 641 F. Supp. at 182-93.
19. As of February 27, 1981, the Habitual Offenders Act was amended such that the trial court,
rather than the jury, now hears the evidence and makes the finding as to whether the sentence should
be enhanced or not. While the trial court erroneously applied the old version of the act, none of the
reviewing courts felt that this error was of any consequence except to permit the defendant a new
sentencing. However, "all of this is mooted by the failure of either party to ever assert any objection."
Nelson, 641 F. Supp. at 179 n.2.
20. Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 288 n.4.
21. Id. at 288-89 n.4.
[Vol. 92
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Several years later, the respondent sought a writ of habeas corpus
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Ar-
kansas, claiming "that the enhanced sentence was invalid because
one of the prior convictions used to support it had been par-
doned."122 When it was discovered that the prior conviction in ques-
tion had indeed been pardoned, "the District Court declared the
enhanced sentence to be invalid."23 The state expressed its intention
to resentence the petitioner, using another prior conviction not of-
fered at the initial sentencing hearing, and the "respondent inter-
posed a claim of double jeopardy." 24
The district court concluded that the double jeopardy clause did
in fact apply to the Arkansas Habitual Offender Act because the
enhancement procedure possessed all "the hallmarks of the trial on
guilt or innocence. ' 25 It noted, however, that despite the applica-
bility of double jeopardy, the state could still resentence if the use
of the invalid prior conviction was trial error as opposed to a de-
ficiency in the proof of the prosecution's case for enhancement.
26
Because the Eighth Circuit, where the District Court for the East-
ern District of Arkansas is located, had never faced the precise issue
in question, the district court followed persuasive authority from
Fifth Circuit holdings. 27 The court concluded that the state's failure
to introduce four valid prior convictions was effectively an acquittal
on the issue of enhancement, and that exposing Nelson to a second
hearing would violate the constitutional prohibition against double
22. Id. at 289.
23. Nelson, 641 F. Supp. at 175.
24. Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 289.
25. Nelson, 641 F. Supp. at 178. The district court relied heavily on Bullington v. Missouri,
451 U.S. 430 (1981), in deciding that double jeopardy applied. Bullington involved a second hearing,
following conviction, on the issue of imposition of a capital sentence. The jury decided that the state
did not carry its burden and thereby refused to order Bullington's execution. When Bullington's life
conviction was set aside by the trial court, the state was prevented from attempting again to secure
capital punishment if a conviction was entered on the basis that the sentencing procedure "was itself
a trial on the issue of punishment," and double jeopardy thereby attached. Nelson, 641 F. Supp. at
178-80 (quoting Bullington, 451 U.S. at 438).
26. Nelson, 641 F. Supp. at 180-81.
27. E.g., Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1985); French v. Estelle, 692 F.2d 1021
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. granted, 457 U.S. 1116 (1982), vacated, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983).
19901
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jeopardy. 28 The court believed this was a question of evidentiary
insufficiency. 29 Thus, although the underlying felony sentence was
unaffected, 0 the district court denied the state a second opportunity
to obtain an enhanced sentence. 31
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit,
affirmed the district court's ruling on the basis that the state had
failed to prove the existence of four prior felony convictions and
thereby failed to prove Nelson was a habitual offender.32 The appeals
court agreed with the district court that the state's evidence was
insufficient and that double jeopardy barred retrial.33 The stage was
set for the state's appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
III. PRIOR LAW
The United States Supreme Court had dealt in large degree
with the question of double jeopardy and its application when it
decided two cases on the same day in 1978.34 With Burks v. United
States35 and Greene v. Massey36 the Court addressed a number of
double jeopardy issues, but left others open.
A. Burks v. United States
The defendant in Burks was tried in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee for robbery.37 The jury
disbelieved Burks' principal defense of insanity, and found him guilty
as charged.38 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals agreed
with the petitioner that "the evidence was insufficient to support
the verdict and reversed his conviction." 3 9 At that time, rather than
28. Nelson, 641 F. Supp. at 185.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 186.
31. Id.
32. Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446, 449-50 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 485 U.S. 904,
rev'd, 109 S. C. 285 (1988).
33. Nelson, 828 F.2d at 449-50.
34. June 14, 1978.
35. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
36. 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
37. Burks, 437 U.S. at 2 (1978).
38. Id. at 3.
39. Burks v. United States, 547 F.2d 968, 970 (6th Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 92
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terminating the case against Burks, the court of appeals remanded
to the district court "for a determination of whether a directed ver-
dict of acquittal should be entered or a new trial ordered.' '40 The
court of appeals directed the district court to choose the appropriate
course (i.e., new trial or acquittal) based on a "balancing of the
equities, ' 41 a procedure adopted from the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Bass.42 That balancing test required the court to direct a
verdict of acquittal unless the court was satisfied that the government
had "sufficient additional evidence" that would enable it to meet
its burden on the issue of defendant's sanity. 43 The Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether a defendant could be tried a sec-
ond time after a reviewing court had "determined that in a prior
trial the evidence was insufficient to sustain the" jury's verdict. 44
In a unanimous decision 45 the Supreme Court felt it should make
no difference that the reviewing court, rather than the trial court,
determined the evidence to be insufficient. 46
The Supreme Court then concluded:
[RIeversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not
constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its
case. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has been convicted
through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, e.g.,
incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial
misconduct. When this occurs, the accused has a strong interest in obtaining a
fair readjudication of his guilt free from error, just as society maintains a valid
concern for insuring that the guilty are punished47
40. Id.
41. U.S. v. Bass, 490 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1974).
42. 490 F.2d at 852-53, overruled on other grounds, United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th
Cir. 1984).
43. Burks, 547 F.2d at 970. The directions from the appeals court did leave open the option
to the district court of refusing to order a new trial if the prosecution "had the opportunity fully
to develop its case or in fact did so at the first trial." Id. The court of appeals felt it had the authority
to order the "balancing" remedy because Burks had explicitly requested a new trial. Id.
44. Burks, 437 U.S. at 5 (1978).
45. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
46. Burks, 437 U.S. at 11.
47. Id. at 15. The Court was impressed with the rationale set forth in United States v. Tateo,
377 U.S. 463 (1964), which justified retrial to correct trial error on the basis that "lilt would be a
high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment because
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The Supreme Court expressed that the same was not true when
a conviction was overturned based on a failure of proof at trial
because such a failure of proof "means that the government's case
was so lacking that it should not have even been submitted to the
jury. ' 48 The Supreme Court held that double jeopardy precluded a
second trial once the reviewing court found the evidence insufficient
to sustain the guilty verdict. Consequently, Burks' case was re-
manded for acquittal.49
B. Greene v. Massey
Greene involved a Florida jury conviction of two co-defendants
for first-degree murder, without a recommendation of mercy. Pur-
suant to Florida law at the time, the trial court sentenced both de-
fendants to death. 0 On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, the
convictions were reversed due to evidentiary insufficiency and new
trials ordered in a 4-3 decision.51 Despite the petitioners claim of
double jeopardy, the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida
allowed a retrial5 2 at which the co-defendants were again convicted
of first-degree murder with each receiving a life sentence, this time
with a recommendation of mercy.53
Both the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
dismissed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.5 4 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari 55 and held, as it did in Burks,
"that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once a
48. Burks, 437 U.S. at 16.
49. Id. at 18. The Court overruled any prior decisions suggesting that moving for a new trial,
as Burks did, was a waiver of right "to a judgment of acquittal on the basis of evidentiary insuf-
ficiency." Id.
50. Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 20 (1978), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1046 (1984).
51. Sosa v. State, 215 So. 2d 736, 737 (Fla. 1968).
52. Sosa v. Maxwell, 234 So. 2d 690, 692-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 240 So. 2d
640 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 951 (1971).
53. Greene, 437 U.S. at 23. The Fourth District Court of Appeals of Florida felt the Second
District's earlier disposition of the issue res judicata and refused to reach the merits of the petitioners'
claim of double jeopardy. Greene v. State, 302 So. 2d 202, 203 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 932
(1975).
54. Greene, 437 U.S. at 23-24.
55. Greene v. Massey, 432 U.S. 905 (1977).
[Vol. 92
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reviewing court 56 has determined that the evidence introduced at trial
was insufficient to sustain the verdict." 57 However, the Court was
troubled by the Florida Supreme Court's "special concurrence"
which, according to the United States Supreme Court, could be in-
terpreted to mean that "the concurring justices thought that the
legally competent evidence . . . at the first trial was insufficient to
prove guilt. That is, they were of the opinion that once the inad-
missable hearsay evidence was discounted, there was insufficient ev-
idence to permit the jury to convict.''58 Conversely, this meant then
that only with the hearsay evidence was there enough evidence to
convict. In a footnote, the United States Supreme Court expressly
reserved its opinion as to the double jeopardy implications of a
retrial following such a holding. 9
IV. CASE ANALYSIS
A. Decision
The dichotomy of trial error and evidentiary insufficiency set out
in Burks v. United States0 ultimately provided the focus of the de-
bate in Lockhart.61 The Lockhart decision would determine whether
admission of the pardoned conviction into evidence constituted trial
error (thereby permitting retrial) or evidentiary insufficiency (thereby
barring retrial on double jeopardy grounds). Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the majority,62 determined that Lockhart presented
the court with the question expressly reserved in Greene v. Massey,63
namely whether double jeopardy allows retrial when a reviewing
court determines that a conviction must be reversed because of er-
roneously admitted evidence and that without the inadmissible ev-
idence there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction.
4
56. I.e., the Florida Supreme Court in the case at hand.
57. Greene, 437 U.S. at 24.
58. Id. at 26.
59. Id. at 26 n.9.
60. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
61. Lockhart v. Nelson, 109 S. Ct. 285 (1988).
62. Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Ken-
nedy.
63. Greene, 437 U.S. at 26 n.9.
64. Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 290.
1990]
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1. Trial Error for the Majority
The majority in Lockhart held that it was "beyond dispute that
this is a situation described in Burks as reversal for 'trial error."' 6 5
The majority analogized the situation in Lockhart to "newly dis-
covered evidence;" ' 66 the evidence of the disputed conviction was
introduced, and only years later was it discovered that it had been
pardoned.67 Once the majority decided that trial error existed rather
than insufficiency of evidence, retrial was permissible under the
precedent of Burks.
2. Going Beyond Trial Error v. Evidentiary Insufficiency
The majority did not stop with its decision that Lockhart should
be reversed due to trial error. The Court may have seen this case
as an opportunity to eliminate the need for future adjudications
to determine whether a situation of trial error or evidentiary in-
sufficiency exists. To accomplish this, the majority examined the
question of whether an appellate court should consider inadmis-
sible evidence on appeal. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the fol-
lowing:
The basis for the Burks exception to the general rule is that a reversal for
insufficiency of the evidence should be treated no differently than a trial court's
granting a judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence. A trial court
in passing on such a motion considers all of the evidence it has admitted, and
to make the analogy complete it must be this same quantum of evidence which
is considered by the reviewing court.6
Consequently, the majority held that the double jeopardy clause
did not preclude retrial where all of the state's evidence admitted
by the trial court-"whether erroneously or not -would have been
sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict." ' 69 The majority did not be-
lieve that Burks had resolved this question. ° Clearly Burks did
65. Id.
66. Id. at 291 n.7.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 291.
69. Id. at 287.
70. Id. at 294 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 92
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not settle the issue of how much evidence was to be considered
on review. Otherwise, Lockhart would not have had to have been
decided by the Supreme Court. This does not detract from the
Lockhart majority opinion; it merely explains the lack of unanim-
ity among the justices in Lockhart despite the fact that the Lock-
hart majority based much of its reasoning on the unanimous Burks
decision. The dissent in Lockhart resulted from different inter-
pretations of the breadth of Burks.
3. The Minority View: The Evidence Never Existed
The minority opinion 71 also focused on Arkansas case law which
held that a "pardoned conviction cannot be counted toward the
four prior convictions required under the State's sentence en-
hancement statute." ' 72 "A pardon simply 'blots out of existence'
the conviction as if it had never happened." ' 73 The dissent's view
in this case was that the improper evidence (pardoned conviction)
could not be considered by the reviewing court along with the
admissible evidence, because the conviction in question ceased ever
to have existed once it was pardoned.
The majority effectively countered the minority's "it was never
really there" argument by stating the following:
Had the defendant offered evidence at the sentencing hearing to prove that
the conviction had become a nullity by reason of the pardon, the trial judge
would presumably have allowed the prosecutor an opportunity to offer evidence
of another prior conviction to support the habitual offender charge. Our hold-
ing today thus merely recreates the situation that would have been obtained
if the trial court had excluded the evidence of the conviction because of the
showing of a pardon.
74
The majority thus felt it had put the parties back where they were
prior to the mistake.
71. Justice Marshall authored the minority opinion, which was joined by Justices Brennan and
Blackmun. Id. at 292.
72. Id. at 293 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Duncan v. State, 254 Ark. 449, 494 S.W.2d 127 (1973).
73. Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 294 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 291.
1990]
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4. Evaluation of the Decision
Lockhart requires that a reviewing court consider all evidence
proffered at trial in deciding whether the evidence was insufficient
or not. It is a common sense, practical decision; one much more
easily applied than the minority's predictable call for some sort
of balancing test.75 Instead of determining evidentiary insufficiency
on review with its accompanyingly hazy hindsight, sufficiency is
determined by what was presented and accepted at trial. It is a
chain reaction: had the pardoned conviction in Lockhart been
properly excluded at trial, how could a reviewing court say that
more evidence would not have been proffered? The majority's at-
tempt at putting the parties back where they started is the best
way to take into account the fact that the parties took one path
when the evidence was admitted and may have taken a completely
different one had the evidence been properly excluded.
B. Implications-Generally
The major implication is clear: the range to which the double
jeopardy clause applies has been narrowed. However, the minority
probably inflates the degree to which this narrowing has oc-
curred. 76 A conviction based on insufficient evidence will still result
in acquittal, and retrial will still be barred based on double jeop-
ardy. However, the reviewing court will consider all the evidence
admitted at trial. The rule in Lockhart should apply only where
evidence is later found to be inadmissable, and where there is
enough evidence (including the evidence in question) on which to
base a conviction.
The distinction between trial error and insufficient evidence is
now moot. All evidence is to be considered on appeal regardless
of its prior categorization (trial error or insufficiency). Insuffi-
ciency of evidence (and bar to retrial based on double jeopardy)
is determined once everything has been considered.
75. Id. at 295-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent's test is one of balancing "the defen-
dant's interest in repose with society's interest in punishing the guilty." Id. This muddy, inconclusive
test clearly falls far short of the coherent and cogent majority ruling.
76. Id. at 292 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 92
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Lockhart's holding is easily applied by lower appellate courts
to a question with the potential of being a "hair-splitting" one.
To formulate rules and guidelines, as the minority would have
liked, 77 would have ultimately led to more litigation, more ques-
tions, and the inevitable appearance of exception upon exception.
The crucial question to be answered is whether this result em-
bodies the classic double jeopardy evil of a state "honing its trial
strategies and perfecting its evidence through successive attempts
at conviction."17  The minority answers affirmatively. However, it
overstates its case. Lockhart will only arise where the court has
allowed in evidence, that is later determined to be inadmissible,
and the prosecutor and defense counsel offer no objection, as in
Lockhart where the conviction had in reality been pardoned. It is
unlikely that this scenario will occur with a great degree of reg-
ularity. To believe otherwise would be to have scant faith in the
bench and bar. And when it does happen, it is so similar to ad-
mission of, for example, improper hearsay evidence, that to treat
it as anything but the trial error, which it so closely resembles, is
illogical.
The onus is on counsel to do his or her homework, so that it
is known with surety whether or not the evidence is proper, or,
as in Lockhart, whether the convictions are valid. Counsel's ex-
pectation that opposing counsel will do his or her work is un-
professional, at worst, and misplaced faith, at best. 79 As well, the
specter of malpractice and professional discipline would in theory
be a deterrent to the occurrence of the scenario in question. A
defendant, forced to bear the expense of another trial, might re-
cover costs from his or her attorney on the basis that the attorney
should have realized that the evidence was defective. Likewise if
77. Id. at 294-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 292 (quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982)).
79. The district court in Nelson issued an order indicating that although Nelson's "attorney
made no contemporaneous objection to the use of the pardoned conviction, counsel's failure to object
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel," thereby not preventing "the Court from considering
the petition." Nelson, 641 F.2d at 175. Ineffective assistance too was considered by the Court as
constituting "cause," thereby satisfying the exception to Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
Nelson, 641 F. Supp. at 175.
1990]
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a prosecutor knowingly entered into evidence convictions or other
evidence that he or she knew to be invalid, professional discipline
would very likely ensue.80 It is probably not uncommon, and maybe
not entirely unjustified, for court appointed criminal defense coun-
sel to almost automatically disbelieve his or her client's insistance
of having been set-up, having been pardoned, or having had no
prior criminal record. However, Lockhart should provide a lesson
to wary counsel: the client is not always lying or inorant.
C. Implications- West Virginia
Aside from generalized implications, Lockhart v. Nelson bears
interest in West Virginia because West Virginia has a sentence en-
hancement procedure not unlike that in the Arkansas statute that
predicated Lockhart.81 Under West Virginia's "habitual criminal
statute," with one prior conviction, five years are added to a sub-
sequent conviction sentence if the sentence imposed is for a definite
terms of years; five years are added to the maximum term of im-
prisonment when an indeterminate sentence is imposed. 82 If two
prior convictions exist, the sentence is extended to confinement
for life.83 Procedurally, the prosecuting attorney has the burden
80. "In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: . . . knowingly use . . . false evidence
[or] . . knowingly make a false statement of law or fact." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoN-
smir~ry DR 7-102(A)(4)-(5) (1981).
"A lawyer shall not knowingly ... offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1987).
81. W. VA. CODE § 61-11-19 (1989).
82. Id. § 61-11-18.
83. Id. The complete text of § 61-11-18 is as follows:
When any person is convicted of an offense and is subject to confinement in the
penitentiary therefor, and it is determined, as provided in section nineteen [§ 61-11-19] of
this article, that such person had been before convicted in the United States of a crime
punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary, the court shall, if the sentence to be imposed
is for a definite term of years, add five years to the time for which the person is or would
be otherwise sentenced. Whenever in such case the court imposes an indeterminate sentence,
five years shall be added to the maximum term of imprisonment otherwise provided for
under such sentence.
When it is determined, as provided in section nineteen hereof, that such person shall
have been twice before convicted in the United States of a crime punishable by confinement
in a penitentiary, the person shall be sentenced to be confined in the penitentiary for life.
The statute was deemed constitutional and not in violation of the proportionality principle contained
in state and federal guarantees against cruel and unusual punishment in State v. Oxier, 369 S.E.2d
14
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of producing evidence of any prior convictions.8 4 If the prisoner
concedes he or she is the person named in the prior convictions,
the court extends the sentence accordingly."5
Faced with a defective enhancement proceeding in State ex rel.
McMannis v. Mohn, 6 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
held that because the underlying conviction was still valid, double
jeopardy did not prevent a resentencing, because resentencing was
"unrelated to the underlying truth-finding process which led to
the conviction and only corrects the improper sentence." '8 7 In ad-
dition, the court permitted the state to reinvoke the recidivist pro-
ceeding to enhance the underlying sentence8 on the basis that:
the initial conviction under our recidivist statute does not violate double jeop-
ardy principles, since the recidivist proceeding does not involve a new offense,
but rather an enhancement of the penalty for the underlying felony convic-
tion .... It is not a multiple punishment for the same offense.
Rather, the punishment for the underlying felony is statutorily lengthened as
a result of the recidivist charge.89
The court concluded that double jeopardy was not applicable
and that "this determination is made upon the entire record sub-
mitted to the jury and not upon the residual evidence remaining
after the appellate court reviews the record for evidentiary er-
ror." 90 It thus appears that West Virginia is entirely in accord with
866 (NV. Va. 1988).
It should be noted that the state must prove that the prior convictions, except for the first offense
and conviction, were for offenses committed after each preceding conviction and sentence. State v.
McMannis, 161 W. Va. 437, 441-42, 242 S.E.2d 571, 575 (1978). This implies that a person who
commits a crime while out on bond awaiting trial on a separate matter, and is later convicted, could
not have his or her sentence enhanced if convicted of the second offense.
84. W. VA. CODE § 61-11-19. The magnitude is that of "beyond a reasonable doubt." McMannis,
161 W. Va. at 441-42, 242 S.E.2d at 575.
85. W. VA. CODa, supra note 84. Only if the prisoner claims he is not the person named in
the prior conviction or remains silent is a jury impanelled, and then only to establish the prisoner's
identity. Id. The recidivist hearing must be held within the same term of court as the conviction or
the enhancement must be removed. Id.; State v. Billups, 368 S.E.2d 723, 724 n.1 (W. Va. 1988).
86. 163 W. Va. 129, 131, 254 S.E.2d 805, 806-07 (1979).
87. Id. at 142, 254 S.E.2d at 812. See also State ex rel. Young v. Morgan, 317 S.E.2d 812,
814-15 (1984).
88. Mohn, 163 W. Va. at 142, 254 S.E.2d at 812.
89. Id. at 142-43, 254 S.E.2d at 812-13.
90. Mohn, 163 W. Va. at 144, 254 S.E.2d at 813.
1990]
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the recent United States Supreme Court ruling in Lockhart.
V. CONCLUSION
When an appeals court finds a conviction was wrongly ob-
tained, two results are possible: the court can remand the case if
the conviction resulted out of trial error, or the court can order
an acquittal if the conviction resulted despite insufficient evidence.
Lockhart v. Nelson will insure that the latter result is less common
because double jeopardy now does not forbid retrial so long as
the sum of the state's evidence admitted-erroneously or not-
would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.9 '
Lockhart may signify a trend toward narrowing double jeop-
ardy, but the case in and of itself is less notorious than the mi-
nority fears. The minority is mistaken in saying that retrial under
the circumstances in Lockhart simply allows the state to "hon[e]
its trial strategies and perfect[ ] its evidence through successive
attempts at conviction." ' 92 As the majority explains, it "merely
recreates the situation" that would have existed had the evidence
been excluded as it properly would have been.93 Who knows how
the prosecution's trial strategy is changed when a certain bit of
evidence is improperly permitted. Maybe other, allowable evi-
dence, for whatever reason, is held back. It would therefore be
wrong to flatly say that there must exist a situation of evidentiary
insufficiency.
Lockhart signifies a break from the less than satisfactory di-
chotomy of trial error versus insufficient evidence. The Court side-
stepped the issue and said simply that all the evidence at trial
would be considered-improper or otherwise-and retrial would
be permissible if there existed enough evidence in total to convict.
The nature of the improper evidence is not important. Rather, the
amount is the critical consideration. 94
91. Lockhart, 109 S. Ct. at 287.
92. Id. at 292 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 291.
94. Id. at 287.
[Vol. 92
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Lockhart is consistent with West Virginia's approach to the
situation in question and is on the whole a decision easily applied
by reviewing courts. Lockhart is a signal that the High Court will
not be satisfied by muddy, murky "balancing tests" and instead
is committed to more practical holdings and rules of law.
Scott E. Schul
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